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Federal Distributive
Politics and the Unequal
Distribution of Violence:
Argentine Provinces
in Comparative Perspective
Lucas Gonza´lez1,2,3 and Marı´a Bele´n Ca´ceres4
Abstract
Violence is unequally distributed across provinces. In Argentina, the least violent provinces
have a murder rate similar to Sweden’s. The most violent ones have a murder rate com-
parable to South Sudan’s. What explains this unequal distribution of violence? This article
claims that political turnover at the provincial level reduces the partisan control over police
forces and challenges previous informal pacts, while being in the opposition to the president
decreases the likelihood of receiving federal assistance to fight violence. When both con-
ditions are met at the same time, crime is more likely to increase. The study examines these
claims using difference-in-difference and regression analysis for panel data of the Argentine
provinces between 2002 and 2015 and a case study of the province of Santa Fe (the most
violent in the country). In the conclusions, it also explores the comparative implications for
the discussion on the unequal distribution of violence in federal democracies.
Resumen
La violencia esta´ distribuida de manera desigual entre las provincias. En Argentina, las pro-
vincias menos violentas tienen una tasa de homicidios similar a la de Suecia. Las ma´s violentas
tienen una tasa de homicidios comparable con la de Suda´n del Sur. ¿Que´ explica esta dis-
tribucio´n desigual de la violencia? Este artı´culo argumenta que la rotacio´n polı´tica a nivel
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provincial reduce el control partidario de las fuerzas policiales y desafı´a pactos informales
Previos, al mismo tiempo que la oposicio´n al presidente reduce la probabilidad de recibir
asistencia federal paracombatir la violencia.Cuandoambas condiciones se cumplenalmismo
tiempo, es ma´s probable que aumente la violencia. El estudio examina este argumento uti-
lizando un ana´lisis de diferencia en diferencia y de regresio´n para datos de panel de las
provincias argentinas entre 2002 y 2015 y un estudio de caso de la provincia de Santa Fe (la
ma´s violenta del paı´s). En las conclusiones, tambie´n explora las implicancias comparadas para
la discusio´n sobre la distribucio´n desigual de la violencia en democracias federales.
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Argentine provinces, violence, murder rates, federalism
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Introduction
Violence is unequally distributed across provinces in Argentina. Catamarca is the least
violent province in the country, with a murder rate of .77 per 100,000 inhabitants in 2008,
similar toSweden’s rate in2012.1 Tierradel Fuegoand San Juanhavesimilar rates. But in the
other end of the distribution, the province of Buenos Aires has a murder rate that is eighteen
times higher than Catamarca, reaching almost 14 homicides per 100,000 inhabitants in 2002.
Santa Cruz had a comparable value in 2003 (14.22) and Santa Fe in 2014. These rates are
similar to South Sudan’s (14.4) and higher than those for the Democratic Republic of Congo
(13.5) and the Central African Republic (13.6; all values for 2012; UNODC). What explains
this unequal distribution of violence among provinces in Argentina?
Argentine provinces are particularly valuable for studying the determinants of vio-
lence. First, there is enormous variation in the outcome. Second, many of the determi-
nants presented in the literature vary considerably among provinces, such as the level of
economic development, poverty rates, and security spending, which are expected to be
related to violence and crime. Furthermore, many other variables can be controlled since
they do not vary among provinces, such as cultural factors (ethnic, religious, or linguistic
fragmentation), or national institutions, relevant in other countries or cross countries
comparisons (Nivette, 2011; Oyefusi, 2008).
This article contends that structural variables make a poor role in explaining the unequal
distribution of violence in this country. Thus, we need to look for variation in political
variables at the subnational level. The main argument is that partisan turnover and being in
the opposition to the federal government reduce the likelihood of controlling violence and
crime. Governors whose party has been in power for longer periods of time have more
political influence and control over police forces and, hence, a more unified regulation of
crime and violence. These governors and their administrations are also more likely to have
informal links with criminal organisations, translating into more possibilities of collusion
and complicity between them. But more political control and complicity produce informal
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agreements that translate into a more efficient regulation of crime. Finally, governors who
are politically allied with the federal government are more likely to receive more federal
funds and operative resources, ranging from specialised police forces to intelligence, to
reduce violence and crime (as Trejo and Ley, 2016, claim for the Mexican case).
On the contrary, governors whose party recently rose to power and those in the
opposition to the federal government tend to have a weaker control of police forces and
fewer resources to control crime. On top of that, incoming political parties are more likely
to challenge previous “informal pacts” between politicians, police forces, and criminal
organisations and fight criminal gangs. Under these conditions, violence is likely to rise.
Exploring the province of Santa Fe, the most violent in the country nowadays, we
found that a weak partisan control over police forces of the incoming Socialist Party
together with a more confrontational stance to previous informal pacts with criminal
gangs and partisan conflicts between the provincial and the federal government seem to
help explaining the rapid surge and the high levels of violence in this province. Structural
factors, such as poverty, inequality, and lack of access to public services, do not appear to
be enough to account for the province’s abrupt and sudden increase in violence.
We organised the article as follows: first, we discuss the theoretical literature on the
topic. Based on this revision, we put forward the main argument and alternative
hypotheses and test them in a large-N analysis. We report the empirical results, discuss
the main findings, and then explore which claims could account for the sudden increase
in Santa Fe’s homicide rate. We present the comparative implications in the conclusion.
The Debate on the Determinants of Violence
There is some agreement in the literature that the typical profile of homicides in low violence
societies is quite different from the profile of homicides in high violence societies. Different
kinds of violence dominate in each of them (Eisner, 2013: 9, 11). Studies on high violence
societies attempt to identify the causes of organised use of force, civil war, genocides,
lynchings, and large-scale massacres.This type ofviolencecan becaused byorganisedgangs
who profit from looting, crime and illegal activities, and kleptocratic rivalry (Collier, 2007;
see Oyefusi, 2008 for a review), lootable wealth and resources (e.g. diamonds, gold, or oil;
Collier, 2007), drug trafficking (and consumption; Caldero´n et al., 2015; Dura´n-Martı´nez,
2015; Fajnzylber et al., 1998; Fo¨hrig, 2015), and competition among drug cartels (Dura´n-
Martı´nez, 2015; Rı´os, 2012). Despite the contributions of this literature, our study focuses on
the empirical debate related to the causes of variation in homicide rates in low violence
societies (i.e. those with an average rate below 10 homicides per 100,000 inhabitants).
Several studies suggest that some of the causes of macro-level variation in homicide rates
in low violence societies are the level of economic and human development, industrialisation,
urbanisation, income inequality, unemployment, and poverty (Ehrlich, 1973; Fajnzylber
et al., 1998, 2002; Fleisher, 1966; Ingram and Da Costa, 2014; Oyefusi, 2008; Portes and
Hoffman, 2003; Yildiz et al., 2013). LaFree (1999), Trent and Pridemore (2012), and Nivette
(2011) find some agreement in the literature: economic development and income equality are
associated with lower homicide rates. Trent and Pridemore (2012) and Nivette (2011) also
conclude that there is evidence linking deprivation (poverty) to higher levels of violence.2
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This study explores whether changes in economic and human development and
inequality explain variation in homicides rates across provinces in Argentina. We
anticipate that these structural variables do not seem to be enough to explain the unequal
distribution of violence across provinces. The data show that structural differences
among provinces have been reduced during the last decade, and they are not as large as
differences in violence among them.
Some recent studies analyse whether there is a relationship between homicides rates
and state capacity, including governance indicators, corruption, and state legitimacy
(Neumayer, 2003; Nivette and Eisner, 2013), spending in social welfare protection
(Bergman and Kessler, 2008; Fearon and Laitin, 2003; Nivette, 2011; Oyefusi, 2008;
Rivera and Za´rate, 2016), social transfers (Ingram and Da Costa, 2014; Lance, 2014),
and spending in security or policing (Archer and Gartner, 1984; Collier, 2007; Ehrlich,
1973; Fajnzylber et al., 1998). Following this discussion, we empirically evaluate
whether variations in provincial state capacity are related to changes in homicides rates
at this level of government.
Other scholars also discuss the role of political variables in explaining changes in
violence. Some of them claim that political stability and low partisan fragmentation
facilitate links between criminal organisations and politicians, increasing violence
(Fo¨hrig, 2015). For others, political competition and partisan fragmentation reduces state
cohesion and enforcement capacity and, thus, increases violence (Dell, 2015; Dura´n-
Martı´nez, 2015; Osorio, 2013). Others pay attention to state-sponsored protection rackets
(Dewey, 2015; Snyder and Dura´n-Martı´nez, 2009; Trejo and Ley, 2017), coordination
and political alliances between the central and subnational governments (Dell, 2015;
Dura´n-Martı´nez, 2015; Rı´os, 2015; Trejo and Ley, 2016; Urrusti, 2012), or political
movements in the opposition (Barndt, 2012).
We pay specific attention to the role of provincial partisan politics and partisan
configurations between the two levels of government that have formal authority over
police and security forces: the provincial and the federal governments (although some
municipalities have begun to play a de facto role too). In particular, we simultaneously
analyse the role of partisan control over police forces, which depends on the provincial
government, and the partisan configurations that affect decisions to allocate more federal
resources to combat crime, which depends on the national government. These config-
urations are not unique to the Argentine case: most federal governments (e.g. Brazil,
Mexico, and the United States) as well as some unitary countries (e.g. Colombia and
Bolivia) have some sort of division of responsibilities between national and subnational
governments (provinces, states, departments, or municipalities) in security matters.
Federal Security Politics and the Control of Violence
We begin our argument with the role of partisan control over police forces. We claim that
political turnover at the provincial level is crucial to explain changes in crime and
violence. Parties in control of the provincial government for a long period of time are
more likely to reduce violence and crime through two main mechanisms: first, the
political control of police forces, and second, more informal connections with criminal
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bands. More political stability, control of the police forces, and informal links produce a
more efficient regulation of crime.
Snyder and Dura´n-Martı´nez (2009: 66–67) claim that political stability increases “both
the reciprocity and credibility of transactions,” improving trust and reputation for com-
pliance with organised crime. We claim that political stability of public officials not only
improves reciprocity, credibility, trust, and reputation. When parties exert political control
in their provinces for a long period of time, they also tend to have more political authority
over police forces. We contend that this helps regulating and reducing criminal activities.
In Argentina, governors are at the top of the provincial public administration and have the
authority to appoint most public employees, usually on party-based criteria (De Luca et al.,
2002: 422).3 Governors supported by politically stable provincial parties tend to have greater
control over the provincial cabinet, the bureaucracy, and have large influence over the
provincial legislative, judiciary, oversight institutions, and police forces. Several studies on
the police forces in Argentina detail the provincial structure of police institutions and their
political allegiance to governors and their parties (Binder, 2004; Eaton, 2008; Fo¨hrig, 2015:
6; Saı´n, 2002). Governors appoint police authorities in their provinces, ranging from the
police chief to heads of the regional delegations. They also influence the structure of police
echelons, deciding promotions, removals, and exonerations. Together with mayors of key
cities, they have large control of the police in operative terms.4 They provide the police with
money and equipment and they influence their operations through the allocation of police
resources (Dewey, 2015: 65–66; Fo¨hrig, 2015: 6–7).
When provincial parties have a larger influence over police forces, they also tend to
have a more unified regulation of criminal organisations. This helps reducing com-
petition inside the police forces in their relations with criminal gangs (including for
illegal businesses). A unified relation allows for more territorial control, a more
effective regulation of crime, a reduction in conflicts (that could affect political
careers), and, as a result, acceptable levels of public security (Dewey, 2015: 65). For
Dura´n-Martı´nez (2015: 1383), “a cohesive security apparatus [ . . . ] makes state pro-
tection more reliable or enforcement more efficient.” In her argument, fragmentation
in the security apparatus makes enforcement less effective and more difficult because it
complicates coordination.
Political stability of public officials not only improves credibility and reputation
(Snyder and Dura´n-Martı´nez, 2009) or more political control over police forces (Dewey,
2015; Dura´n-Martı´nez, 2015). More political stability over time also means more
informal connections between local politicians, police forces, and criminal organisa-
tions. On the one hand, this may translate into more possibilities of collusion and
complicity between local politicians and criminal organisations (Fo¨hrig, 2013), espe-
cially when all of them share physical presence in the same territory. But on the other
hand, more stability and informal connections may also produce a more efficient reg-
ulation of crime: the main actors are more likely to agree on the level of violence that is
socially accepted in their territories to make their relations sustainable over time.
Political stability and social acceptability make these informal pacts sustainable. When
informal agreements collapse and there are sudden changes in these socially accepted
levels of violence, social pressures on politicians and police forces will be more likely to
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increase. All actors could pay a high price in a situation like this: not only citizens
(because of the actual increase in violence), but also politicians and police forces
(because they face stronger social pressures), and even criminals (who may now confront
more challenges to their illegal activities).
New parties, on the contrary tend to have a weaker control over their territories and,
hence, a weaker influence over police forces, especially when they have just accessed
office. Moreover, they are less likely to collude and develop relations of complicity with
criminal organisations. New political forces are more likely to fight criminal gangs and
challenge their previous “informal pacts” with politicians and police forces. Under these
conditions, more violence is likely to occur.
We do not expect all incoming parties to automatically fight criminal gangs and
challenge previous informal pacts. We expect this to be more likely, in particular, when
“new” parties access to power for the first time, when they take “outsiders” into office,
and when they campaign denouncing “traditional” parties and their linkages with crime.
Under these circumstances, new parties are more likely to give more autonomy to police
forces and abandon informal pacts with police forces. The occurrence of this outcomes is
less probable when traditional opposition parties access to power as a consequence of
provincial partisan turnover.
Shirk and Wallman (2015: 1360–1361) argue that political turnover in Mexico
unsettled the negotiated arrangements between state officials and criminal organisations.
More competition among police groups and criminal gangs to control the territory also
diminishes police capacity to regulate crime (Dura´n-Martı´nez, 2015; Rı´os, 2012). All
this expands violence.
Partisan provincial politics are important to control crime. But security policies do not
depend exclusively on the provincial government. The central government also plays a
key role in combating crime in violent provinces. Rı´os (2015) claims that crime is
reduced when the same party rules across levels of government because of a more
efficient communication and coordinated policies. Trejo and Ley (2016) argue that
partisan conflict leads to the politicisation of military deployments and judicial pro-
cesses. Our main claim is that distributive politics play a decisive role.
In particular, we claim that governors who are politically allied with the federal gov-
ernment will receive more federal funds and assistance and, hence, be more capable of
reducing crime.5 Federal coordination with provinces is critical in combating crime (Rı´os,
2015; Trejo and Ley, 2016). This is so because the federal government can provide crucial
resources provinces (and municipalities) usually lack: money and operative resources,
ranging from specialised police forces to intelligence.6 Less developed provinces need
federal support because they have limited resources to tackle violence and crime. But
larger and more populated provinces also need the federal government because of the scale
of crime and their incapacity to cope with it alone, especially considering provinces are
responsible for the delivery of several social services (including health and education) that
the central government began to decentralise in the late 1970s.7
Although federal police forces have formal jurisdiction over the entire territory, they do
not necessarily have effective presence across it. The federal government can decide
whether to reinforce the effective presence of security forces (federal police, naval
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prefecture, and national gendarmerie) according to political and programmatic considera-
tions. In line with what Trejo and Ley (2016: 14) found for the case of Mexico, we argue that
the federal government will be more likely to support politically allied subnational units
(provinces and municipalities) in combating crime and violence. But federal support does
not only mean more federal security forces, as claimed by Trejo and Ley (2016). Since
several types of federal resources (ranging from federal infrastructure to social programmes
and security spending and forces) are also decisive to fight crime, political affiliation
between presidents and governors will be critical to explain reductions in homicide rates.
In sum, political turnover at the provincial level and being in the opposition to the
federal government are more likely to be associated to increases in crime. The effect on
crime will be larger when these two conditions are met at the same time; that is, we expect
that incoming opposition governors (particularly in the case of new parties) are more
likely to face more crime (cell D; Figure 1). We expect lower violence when one of the two
conditions is not met. In the case of alignment with national government and partisan
turnover (cell B), the control of violence will be more dependent on the capacity of the
central government to send resources and forces. In the case of no alignment and partisan
stability (cell C), the outcome will depend on the provincial fiscal and operative capacity.
Variables and Data
The main dependent variable is the provincial homicide rate per 100,000 inhabitants. We
select this variable as a proxy for violent crime because underreporting, and hence sys-
tematic bias, is “lower than low-value property crime (e.g., common theft) and for crimes
carrying a social stigma for the victim (e.g., rape)” (Fajnzylber et al., 2002: 1326). The rate is
calculated based on the number of intentional homicides in each province8 and provided by
the National Criminal Information System (Annual Reports, National Direction for Crim-
inal Policy, Ministry of Justice, Security, and Human Rights) between 2002 and 2008.9
The two main independent political variables are provincial party turnover and
whether governors are politically allied with the president. Provincial party turnover is
coded as 1 if there was a change in the provincial party in office in a given year, 0
otherwise. We use this variable to test the role of partisan control over police forces. The
Political Turnover
Partisan Stability Partisan Turnover
Alignment 
with the 
National 
Government
Alignment A) Lowest Violence B) Medium Violence 
(depends on federal capacity)
No
Alignment
C) Medium Violence (conditional 
on provincial capacity)
D) Highest Violence
Figure 1. Theoretical Expectations.
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second variable is a dummy to determine whether governors are politically allied with
the president and we use it to explore the role of partisan alliances in explaining variation
in the outcome. This variable is coded as 1 if president and governors are in the same
governing coalition in a given year, 0 otherwise. We coded this variable during fieldwork
based on official electoral data, information from newspapers, and interviews with
provincial experts.10
Large-N Empirical Analysis
Having presented the main claim, we now test whether these variables are statistically
associated in a large-N analysis. We first use a difference-in-difference (DiD) estimation
technique, which compares the average change over time in the outcome variable for a
treatment group in relation to the average change in the same variable over time for a
control group. We use three different treatment groups. The first one is a group of
provinces in which there was party turnover; the second includes provinces ruled by
opposition governors; and the third one is a group of provinces in which the two previous
conditions are met at the same time. We analyse the treatment and control groups before
and after 2007, the year in which there was turnover in provincial elections and oppo-
sition governors for the available data series.11
Table 1 reports the DiD results. The first column shows the DiD results between
provinces in which there was turnover in the 2007 elections and the control group. The
difference between both groups before and after treatment is .32, but this value is not
statistically significant. The second column describes the DiD results for provinces in
which the governor is in opposition to the federal government and the control group. The
difference between both groups before and after treatment is now .14, but once again this
value does not reach the usually accepted levels of statistical significance.
The last column presents the DiD results for provinces that met both conditions
(turnover and opposition governor) and the control group. Provinces in which there was
party turnover and the governor was in opposition to the president had, on average, 2.4
Table 1. DiD, All Provinces, 2002–2015.
Variables Party turnover Opposition governor Turnover and opposition
Before Control 5.504 5.792 5.662
Treated 6.267 5.569 6.440
Diff (T-C) 0.763 (0.532) 0.223 (0.538) 0.778 (0.862)
After Control 4.705 5.045 4.757
Treated 5.786 4.961 7.917
Diff (T-C) 1.080* (0.594) 0.084 (0.601) 3.160*** (0.964)
DiD 0.318 (0.797) 0.139 (0.864) 2.382* (0.067)
Note: Standard errors reported in parenthesis. DiD ¼ difference-in-difference.
*p < .100.
**p < .050.
***p < .010.
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more homicides per 100,000 inhabitants than the rest of the provinces and this result is
statistically significant. As we expected, it is when both conditions are met at the same
time that the likelihood of crime increasing is higher.
We included a final estimation comparing the four largest and more urbanised
provinces in the country (Buenos Aires, Co´rdoba, Mendoza, and Santa Fe). These four
cases are quite similar in most structural control variables, ranging from level of urba-
nisation, population density, and a range of social indicators (such as levels of poverty,
inequality, and access to basic services).12 The four cases are different, though, in the
values of the main political variables related to our claim: in one of them, both conditions
are present (Santa Fe); in two others, only one condition is met (turnover in Mendoza,
and opposition governor in Co´rdoba); in the last case, none of the previous conditions is
observed (Buenos Aires). Table 2 presents the average murder rates for the four prov-
inces before and after treatment. The difference between the treatment group (Santa Fe)
and the controls before and after treatment is 3.27 and statistically significant. In other
words, the province in which both conditions are met at the same time (there was party
turnover and the governor was in opposition to the president) had, on average, 3.3 more
homicides per 100,000 inhabitants than the control provinces after 2007. This is a
substantial difference between the treatment and control groups, equivalent to 1.22 times
the standard deviation of the dependent variable.
Regression Analysis
In a second step, we explore the relationships among the main variables using an
ordinary least squares regression with panel corrected standard errors (Beck and Katz,
1995), which is more appropriate for n-dominant data (as opposed to time-dominant
data). We conducted several tests to confirm this estimation is the most appropriate.
First, the Breusch–Pagan/Cook–Weisberg test (and a scatterplot for the error term)
indicates that there is heteroskedasticity in the error term; and the Wooldridge test
reports some modest autocorrelation in the panel data. Therefore, we use a model that
Table 2. Average Homicide Rates, Four Selected Provinces, 2002–2015.
Variables Opposition governor Allied governor
Party turnover SANTA FE MENDOZA
Before After Before After
8.01 11.28 8.94 7.96
No party turnover CO´RDOBA BUENOS AIRES
Before After Before After
4.24 4.00 8.56 7.81
Source: Authors’ calculations based on SNIC data.
Note: SNIC ¼ National Criminal Information System.
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computes the variance–covariance estimates and the standard errors assuming that the
disturbances are heteroskedastic and correlated across panels. Second, to test whether
we should use random or fixed effect models, we run a Hausman test of random versus
fixed effects. The p-value for the main model using random and fixed effects is .313,
much larger than the advised .05. Therefore, we conclude that it is safe to use random
effects models. Third, the variance inflation factor (VIF) test reports there is no serious
collinearity among the main variables in the model. Finally, the Levin–Lin–Chu unit-
root test reveals that the data are stationary and, hence, it is safe not to work with first
differences (i.e. change in the dependent variable).
Some of the findings in Table 3 support our main theoretical expectations. Regression
results indicate that provinces in which there is partisan turnover and an opposition
governor have a larger homicide rate. The interaction term between these two variables
is positive, robust, and statistically significant. Holding structural control variables
constant, these provinces increase their murder rate in 1.8 homicides per 100,000
inhabitants (see Figure 2). These results provide further support for the previous
finding: when both conditions are met (and not when each of them is considered
separately), homicides are more likely to increase. There is a clearly significant pos-
itive impact if an opposition governor came to power recently. In other words, the
opposition variable has the hypothesised impact only under a condition of party
turnover, and party turnover has a positive effect on crime when there is an opposition
governor taking office.
Table 3. PCSE Regression Results.
Variables Model 1
Partisan Turnover  Opposition Governor 1.834*** (0.417)
Partisan turnover 0.588 (0.416)
Opposition governor 0.725* (0.385)
Partisan fragmentation 0.199* (0.118)
Social infrastructure spending per capita (ln) 0.038 (0.632)
Inequality 2.897 (7.736)
Human development indicators (ln) 2.884*** (0.706)
Gross domestic product (GDP) growth 0.206 (0.315)
Population 0.000*** (0.000)
Urbanisation 3.209** (1.610)
Constant 0.923 (8.094)
Observations 141
R2 0.16
Cross-sectional units 24
Note: Dependent variable: murder rate per 100,000 inhabitants. Unstandardised regression coefficients.
Standard errors reported in parenthesis. PCSE ¼ panel corrected standard errors; GDP ¼ gross domestic
product.
*p < .100.
**p < .050.
***p < .010.
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We do not have clear evidence on the role of provincial party system fragmentation
(in terms of votes). This variable appears to be negatively associated with murder rates in
our model, which is contrary to most theoretical expectations in the literature, but its
coefficient is small and very close to the limit of statistical significance (p ¼ .091).
On top of that, the standard error is high.13 Hence, results should be taken with prudence
and more research should further explore this relationship to find more conclusive
evidence. The important fact, though, is that our main variables remain robust even after
controlling for partisan fragmentation.
We also control for provincial structural variables. Results indicate that provinces
with higher human development indices have lower murder rates (as several scholars in
the literature found; e.g. Eisner, 2013; Nivette, 2011). They also show that there is a
positive association between urbanisation, population, and homicide rates. All these
coefficients are statistically significant. Provincial inequality and national economic
growth, on the contrary, do not appear to be statistically related to violence.14
Part of the literature suggests that certain types of spending related to state capacity
should reduce violence (Neumayer, 2003; Nivette and Eisner, 2013). Hence, we also
included provincial spending variables in the model. As expected, results indicate that
social infrastructure spending is negatively related to murder rates, but this coefficient
is not statistically significant. We run separate models with other spending variables
(not included in this one due to collinearity). Controlling for the same variables,
security spending is positively related to murder rates, while patronage (personnel)
spending is negatively related to them (see models 2 and 3, Table 4, Online Appendix).
We have theoretical reasons to suggest that provinces that are more violent tend to
spend more in security (but it can also be that more security spending increases vio-
lence). Future studies can further explore these connections between spending vari-
ables and crime rates.
Figure 2. Interaction Effect Between Partisan Turnover and Opposition Governor.
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We also included other controls, such as provincial family and age structure as well as
sex ratios. Results for the main variables in the model remain basically unchanged, while
the coefficients for these controls move in the theoretically expected direction and are
statistically significant (see model 4, Table 4, Online Appendix).
We run another model to explore the effect of federal transfers (they are collinear with
provincial spending variables). Holding third variables constant, a 1 per cent increase in
federal transfers reduces murder rates in .8 homicides per 100,000 inhabitants. This
result is robust and statistically significant (as in the work of Ingram and Da Costa, 2014;
Lance, 2014). We do not have data on federal transfers that provinces may use to reduce
security. But we have data on federal discretionary transfers that provinces can use
without restrictions. Results indicate that, controlling for the same variables, an increase
in these federal transfers reduces murder rates in .8 homicides per 100,000 inhabitants.
This coefficient is also statistically significant (p ¼ .006).
We calculated two indices that measure the degree of institutionalisation of the area in
charge of security at the provincial level (the Index of Institutionalisation of Security, IS)
and provincial criminal courts (the Index of Institutionalisation of Provincial Criminal
Justice, IPCS), as proxies of provincial state capacity (see the Online Appendix for a
detailed explanation of how they are calculated). These indices report how politically
relevant is the area of security in the province and how many state resources the pro-
vincial government allocates to it. Due to the limited available data, we could not include
these indices in the regression models. However, the correlation coefficient between the
IS and murder rates is positive (.17), while the coefficient between the IPCS and murder
rates is negative (.17). These results may indicate that more violent provinces tend to
have more institutionalised security functions and that those with stronger criminal
justice systems tend to have lower murder rates.
In sum, these results provide significant political implications: governors who have
been in power for a longer time, rule more capable provincial states, are politically allied
with the federal government, and receive more federal transfers, tend to face less vio-
lence. These variables are easier to change politically than structural variables: yearly
changes in human development indicator (HDI) are quite modest (the standard deviation
is .03) and in terms of public policy a substantive change in it requires medium-term to
long-term policy efforts.
The R2 in the main model is 16 per cent. It indicates that a substantive share of the
variation in the dependent variable is left unexplained and that we need better theories,
data, and models to account for the factors that increase violent crime beyond the ones
included in this study. Case studies, particularly in more and less violent subnational
units, may contribute to a better understanding of the main factors involved in the
process. We intend to do this in the next section.
A Case Analysis: The Province of Santa Fe
Having presented the main claim and some results in a large-N analysis, we now study
the Province of Santa Fe. We selected this case because it is the most violent province in
the country nowadays and because it experienced the largest increase in the dependent
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variable over time. The murder rate in the Province of Santa Fe doubled in less than a
decade, increasing from 6.56 homicides per 100,000 inhabitants in 2006 to 13.2 in 2014.
The average for this province (9.21) is the highest in the country, and higher than the
province of Buenos Aires’s (8.02), the Federal Capital’s (4.98), and Co´rdoba’s (4.11),
which is a very similar province in socio-economic and demographic terms. The max-
imum value of Santa Fe (13.2 in 2014) is 2.7 times larger than the maximum value of
Co´rdoba (5.22).15
We observe that the main socio-economic variables in this province have improved
over the last few years: its gross geographic product grew more than eleven points on
average between 1993 and 2009. Between 2002 and 2009, this growth was 23.2 per
cent. During this period, Santa Fe had the largest year-on-year rise in the murder rate:
37 per cent between 2006 and 2007 (increasing from 6.56 to 9 homicides per 100,000
inhabitants). Poverty dropped 68 per cent between 1980 and 2010 or 46 per cent
between 2001 and 2010 (National Censuses, INDEC). The Gini index of income
inequality of the employed population (EPH-INDEC) for Santa Fe also fell from .43 in
2003 to .34 in 2014. In comparative terms, the provincial average for the 2003–2013
series (.38) is similar to that in the most populated districts. The provincial HDI
remained very stable during the period (there was a marginal improvement of only .06
per cent). It increased 2 per cent each year during the years with the highest increase in
the homicide rate (2006 and 2007).
These data seem to indicate that the rapid increase in violence in the province of Santa
Fe is not associated with the socio-economic variables most usually related to it. None of
the correlations between its homicide rate and its HDI, average income per capita, and
Gini coefficient of income inequality reach the usually accepted values of statistical
significance (p values range between .54 and .98).
Despite these aggregate results, some scholars claim that structural conditions in the
province of Santa Fe’s shantytowns (villas de emergencia) deteriorated systematically
during the last decade (Emmerich and Rubio, 2014). In these shantytowns, a generation
of youth has suffered from social exclusion and long-term unemployment. For many of
them, violence and drugs are an option for survival. The business of illegal drugs,
kidnappings, bank robberies, theft, and the illegal sale of car parts are economic activ-
ities that prospered in marginalised sectors of society (El Paı´s, 2015; Emmerich and
Rubio, 2014). In fact, several experts and pundits point out that violence in Santa Fe city
and Rosario is drug related violence (Emmerich and Rubio, 2014; Eventon, 2013). For
them, several organised drug gangs, who profit from crime and illegal activities, caused
this sharp increase in crime. Rivalry among them produced an escalation in violence.16
When the illegal market is competitive and criminal organisations dispute the territory,
violence is likely to be more frequent as gangs try to drive out competitors using force
against them (Dura´n-Martı´nez, 2015: 1383; Skaperdas, 2001: 187). Some of these
analysts contend that these gangs need institutional support as well as state protection
for their proliferation (Dewey, 2012, 2015; Snyder and Dura´n-Martı´nez, 2009). They
claim that police corruption contributed to the escalation of violence in Rosario (BBC,
2014; El Paı´s, 2015; Emmerich and Rubio, 2014; Eventon, 2013; Universidad
Nacional de Rosario, 2013) and in other big cities in the country (Eventon, 2013;
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Fo¨hrig, 2015; Saı´n, 2002). But according to official figures and data from the Uni-
versity of Rosario, more than 80 per cent of the homicides in Rosario are related to
disputes between young men in marginalised neighbourhoods, due to fights between
gangs, and not related to drugs (BBC, 2014).
Despite the disagreements over the role of drugs and the limited explanatory power of
structural factors in accounting for violence in Santa Fe, we now explore whether the
main political variables in our argument may have affected violence in this province.
Since Argentina’s transition to democracy in 1983 until 2007, Santa Fe had been gov-
erned by the Partido Justicialista (PJ). This party remained in power until the Socialist
Hermes Binner was elected governor in 2007. During this electoral year only, the murder
rate increased almost 30 per cent, from 8.5 to 11. The average murder rate during the PJ’s
administration was 8.60. We have available data from 2002 to 2006, which surely
overestimates this mean value. In contrast, the average murder rate during the Socialist
government almost doubled, rising to 15.24 (data from Ministerio Pu´blico de la Acu-
sacio´n, 2014).
We argue that partisan configurations between levels of government are important,
but fundamentally between those which have formal authority over security. In
Argentina, only the federal and provincial governments have constitutional authority
over security forces. This makes partisan configurations at these two levels much more
important than the one at the municipal government. Without denying the relevance of
local politics in the control of violence, we analyse the role of partisan control over
police forces, which depends on the provincial government; and the partisan decisions to
allocate federal resources and deploy special security forces to combat crime, which
depends on the federal government.
The twenty-three years of PJ ruling in the Province of Santa Fe had allowed the
governor to exercise a tight control over police forces through political appointments in
the higher ranks and the selective distribution of resources. These highly controlled
police forces were capable of reaching solid agreements with relatively centralised
criminal organisations, which resulted in a more contained version of local violence. In
this way, the police had the capacity to control crime through effective regulation and
informal pacts, and thus, guarantee governability and the possibility of managing
criminal matters without social visibility or public scandal.
In 2007, the PJ electoral power and stability collapsed. Consequently, the tight control
and stable informal agreements that the PJ had built with police forces to control criminal
organisations also vanished. This came to an end as the Socialist Party gained power.
This “new” party accessed the governorship for the first time in the history of the
province, in a campaign in which it denounced “traditional” parties, particularly the PJ,
and their linkages with crime. The Socialist Party in government triggered divisions in
police control and, on top of that, decided to give the police more autonomy in dealing
with crime and to remove partisan politics from this matter. Some security specialists
and public authorities we interviewed in Santa Fe also recognised that the Socialists did
not have a clear and consistent security plan to reduce violence (Interview with former
provincial security minister and two of his advisors – not named at their request to
preserve their identities; Interview with local councillor Marı´a Eugenia Schmuck;
62 Journal of Politics in Latin America 11(1)
Interview with Franco Bartolacci, Dean of the Faculty of Political Science, National
University of Rosario; 13–14 September, 2016).
Divisions inside police forces proliferated and made them less able to exert control
over criminal activities. Rau´l Lamberto, security minister of the province during the
Socialist government, publicly acknowledged that “the government lost control and
command over the police” (La Nacio´n, 2012). To revert that situation, he proposed a
decentralisation reform that divided the province in smaller territorial units, each in
charge of a police chief. The main goal of the reform was to increase social account-
ability and political control over them. Instead of augmenting control, the reform frag-
mented even further the police, which led to a weaker political control and a further
increase in violence (Interview with former provincial security public official; 14 Sep-
tember, 2016). The homicide rate increased 43 per cent after the reform, from 16 murders
every 100,000 inhabitants in 2012 to 23 in 2013 (Ministerio Pu´blico de la Acusacio´n,
2014). The reform was reversed in 2016 by a new minister of security.
The PJ opposition leaders denounced that in Santa Fe, “there are bands that fight for
the control of the territory” (La Capital, 2014). They requested the intervention of the
provincial police and asked the governor Antonio Bonfatti to appoint a “civilian of trust”
as the police chief in order to stop the escalation of killings (El Litoral, 2013). The
federal government’s Secretary of Security also stated that “the most serious problem
with the Santa Fe government is police malfunction, which is an autonomous force, and
does not follow orders” (La Nacio´n, 2015a). Federal deputy Eduardo Toniolli denounced
that “in the province of Santa Fe, police forces are self-governed” (La Nacio´n, 2014b).
As a result, illegal activities mushroomed and diversified during this period in the
province (Emmerich and Rubio, 2014). A fragmented police force was not able to
impose control over a growing number of increasingly powerful criminal gangs.
In many cases, the police got involved in criminal activities (La Nacio´n, 2012; Uno
Santa Fe, 2015). In total, 1,589 police officers were involved in criminal cases (4 per cent
of them for charges related to drug trafficking) and 829 were put on administrative leave
(data up to 2015; Cları´n, 2015). Only in 2015, 233 Santa Fe police officers were dis-
missed from duties (115 in 2014). Four police chiefs were replaced between 2011 and
2015 on corruption charges. Hugo Tognoli, one of those former police chiefs, was
arrested in 2012 and condemned to imprisonment for six years in 2015 for his links with
drug traffickers (La Nacio´n, 2012; Te´lam, 2015; Uno Santa Fe, 2015). The three
Socialist governors had 11 police chiefs during their mandates. Each of them lasted 9.8
months on average. Five police chiefs were replaced during the first Socialist admin-
istration of Hermes Binner (2007–2011). Dura´n-Martı´nez (2015, 1395–1396) points out
that this similar combination of partisan and political fragmentation as well as criminal
competition generated sharp increases in violence in Ciudad Jua´rez and Tijuana, Mexico.
Although the murder rate in Santa Fe has been growing fast since 2007, it marginally
declined in 2014. The Socialist Party had been governing Santa Fe for almost a decade
and got re-elected in 2015, making time horizons for public officials more stable and
more certain than during their first term.
Having analysed the relevance of partisan provincial politics in controlling crime, we
now examine federal–provincial relationships. The provincial and the federal
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governments had tense political relations during this period. The Socialist Party,
although a lukewarm political ally of the president during the early 2000s, finally moved
to the opposition in 2007. Politicians from both the federal and the provincial govern-
ments accused each other of being responsible for the increase in crime. The Socialist
governor, Antonio Bonfatti, publicly denounced that the federal government left the
province alone in their fighting against violence (Perfil, 2013). The federal Security
Secretary accused the Socialist governor of “granting large autonomy to the provincial
police, which ended up in high levels of corruption” and an increase in violence (La
Nacio´n, 2015b).
Despite this tense political relationship, the national government finally decided to
send 3,000 militarised federal police forces (gendarmerı´a and prefectura) to control
crime in the province in April, 2014 (La Nacio´n, 2014a). These troops were assigned to
stay for about three months (Pa´gina 12, 2014) but the operation lasted 250 days. The
federal government also collaborated providing federal intelligence services (La Nacio´n,
2015a) and resources for social infrastructure in the most violent areas (to open streets,
recover public spaces, and construct water and sewerage networks, and housing), reform
the police, and to increase the salaries of provincial police officers (La Nacio´n, 2014a,
2014c).
Provincial politicians publicly recognised that “this decrease in murder rates coin-
cides with the arrival of national forces in the province but also with the decision of
working together with provincial security forces and the provincial justice.” “The
presence of security forces is key but also the education and social inclusion programs
that are being carried out in the neighborhoods” (El Litoral, 2017). Murder rates began to
decline in 2014. Federal assistance and not only federal troops appear to be crucial in
controlling crime more effectively than would have been the case if only provincial
resources and police forces were alone in dealing with crime.
Discussion
In this article, we contend that there is not enough structural variation among provinces
in Argentina to explain the unequal distribution of violence across its territory. Hence,
we looked for variation in political variables at the provincial level. Provincial level data
provide evidence partially supporting some of our claims. Governors whose parties have
been in power for a longer period of time and are allied with the federal government are
more likely to keep murder rates low. On the contrary, provinces in which there is
partisan turnover and governors opposed to the federal government are more likely to
face higher murder rates. Murder rates are more likely to escalate when these two
conditions (turnover and opposition governor) are present at the same time. Incoming
opposition governors have more difficulties controlling police forces and are more likely
to challenge previous informal pacts between politicians, the police, and criminals.
Moreover, they are less likely to receive federal assistance to fight violence. All this
should increase murder rates.
The case of Santa Fe also appears to reaffirm these assertions: violence increased
when a new party gained office and provincial authorities were not able to exert political
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control over the provincial police, giving it large autonomy, and when the new
administration decided to challenge previous informal arrangements between politicians,
police forces, and criminal gangs.
We stress the relevance of provincial political control of police forces. But controlling
and diminishing violent crime is a task that cannot be addressed only by provincial (or
municipal) governments, in many cases devastated by social problems and the fiscal
obligations to deliver decentralised basic services. Federal support and assistance is
crucial, as we also found in Santa Fe. In this case, federal backing depended mostly on
political configurations between levels of government. Federal support means not only
more federal security forces intervening in provinces, but also a stronger and more
redistributive federal state.
Our results also indicate that when provinces spend more in social infrastructure and
public employment violence tends to diminish. The opposite is the case when security
spending increases, but more research is needed to further assess this particular finding.
Summing up, our results indicate that a more stable political control of police forces, a
politically allied and redistributive federal government, and more active provincial
administrations, which help improving province-level HDIs, are some of the key factors
that help reducing violent crime.
These findings have comparative implications beyond the case studied. In countries
where security politics do not depend on a single level of government, we should pay more
attention to the subnational political control of police forces and to political relations
between national and subnational governments, particularly in weakly institutionalised
democracies in the developing world, where rule of law is feeble and the federal and
provincial judiciaries are not completely independent from political pressures.
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Notes
1. The comparison between the murder rates in the Argentine provinces with murder rates in
other countries is only for illustrative purposes. The study will only systematically analyse and
compare rates at the provincial level within the country.
2. For comparative evidence on Latin American countries, see Rivera (2016).
3. In some provinces, public employment is one of the most (if not the most) important economic
activity and source of income.
4. Auyero (2006: 260) provides an account of the political control and influence Peronist mayors
and brokers exerted over police forces during the looting episodes of Argentina in 2001.
5. Several authors document the partisan logic in the distribution of federal funds and programs
to the provinces in Argentina (see, Gonza´lez and Mamone, 2015; Lodola, 2005; inter alia).
There are possible interactions between the main variables: for instance, the orientation of the
provincial government toward the federal government is likely to shape the political stability
of the province in question. We thank one of the Journal of Politics in Latin America (JPLA)
Reviewers for this comment.
6. Several security experts argued during interviews that public confidence in federal security
forces (national gendarmerie and naval prefecture) is higher than confidence in provincial
police forces. This could also help them fighting crime.
7. According to the Argentine Civil Code, some criminal activities, such as drug-trafficking and
drug production, are under the legal jurisdiction of the federal government.
8. Intentional homicides are simple homicides (Article 79 of the Penal Code [PC]) or aggravated
homicides (Article 80, PC), equivalent to first and second degree murders, and manslaughter,
including murder in a state of violent emotion (Article 81, PC), during robbery (Article 165,
PC) and murder in a fight (Article 95, PC).
9. Between 2009 and 2013, the National Criminal Information System did not produce official
provincial data on homicides, and only started publishing its annual reports again in 2014.
The 2014 Annual Report (pp. 25–26) reveals data reliability problems in some provinces for
the previous period. Despite these problems, to the best of our knowledge, this is the first
empirical study using the most recent and available data for Argentina and we hope to raise
awareness on the need to have better official data and more empirical studies on this topic,
which is at the top of the concerns of Argentines, according to a recent poll (Analogı´as, in
Infobae, 2016).
10. See the Online Appendix for definitions and data sources for the rest of the variables.
11. We cannot do this analysis before and after the 2003 gubernatorial elections because no
province met both conditions at the same time that year.
12. We did not include the Federal Capital because it is different from the other four cases in most
structural variables.
13. Pairwise correlation coefficients between provincial party system fragmentation (in terms of
votes and seats) and murder rates do not reach the standards of statistical significance, con-
tributing to the previous inconclusive results.
14. Pairwise correlation results confirm this finding between inequality and homicide rates.
Despite this, the correlation for the province of Buenos Aires is positive, robust, and statis-
tically significant (.80), a bit lower than for human development indicator (HDI; which is
negative, .82). Larger time series and more in depth analysis of the cases can provide more
precision to this correlation. We also found a positive but statistically insignificant relation-
ship between provincial poverty and homicide rates. We did not include this variable in the
main model because of the high collinearity between it and HDI.
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15. The two most important cities in the province of Santa Fe, Santa Fe city (capital of the
province) and Rosario (the third largest city in the country), rank among the most violent
in Argentina. The Economist (2016) recently called Rosario “Argentina’s crime capital.” Its
homicide rate was 23 per 100,000 inhabitants in 2013 (more than four times the national
average and almost thirty times larger than Catamarca’s), increasing abruptly (more than a 187
per cent) in a relatively short period of time (between 2004 and 2013). The city of Santa Fe had
an average homicide rate of 21.14 per 100,000 inhabitants between 2001 and 2014, increasing
from a minimum of 15.1 in 2005 to a maximum of 32.8 in 2014 (one of the highest values in
the country). Although it is not the main focus of this study, we recognise the relevance of
studying local dynamics. Future studies could explore them in more detail.
16. Future studies could further explore the role of drugs in the Argentine provinces. Unfortu-
nately, we only accessed data for drug consumption (marihuana, cocaine, and pasta base) in
the provinces for 2008 (National Survey on Psychoactive Substances, ENPreCoSP, INDEC).
We could not access comparable data on drug trafficking at the subnational level. Drug
consumption (cocaine and marihuana) is positively correlated to murder rates (.33 and .32)
(pasta base is not), but the statistical significance is above the usual thresholds. More research
is needed since the number of observations is very low.
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